Ideas from 'Explaining Explanation' by David-Hillel Ruben [1990], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Explaining Explanation' by Ruben,David-Hillel [Routledge 1990,0-415-08765-1]].
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
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Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't?
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
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The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
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An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
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The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
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Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
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Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately
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